to infer that an event really happened (Bush & ticipants were asked to think about either factual (how things looked) or affective (how Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988; Johnson & Suengas, 1989) . While they felt) aspects of the experiences. When participants subsequently rated their memoamount or type of emotional detail may often be a good cue to the source of one's own or ries for various phenomenal characteristics, there was some evidence that thinking about other people's memories (''Dave must have told me that idea because I am really irritated affective aspects of events reduced the availability of perceptual aspects compared to that someone else had it first and nobody irritates me like Dave''), emotional involvement thinking about more factual aspects of events.
Suengas and Johnson speculated that such a at encoding may not always be good for source monitoring if emotional processing oc-trade-off between perceptual and affective characteristics might reduce source monitorcurs at the expense of processing other information that may provide better cues to source. ing because perceptual characteristics typically provide better cues to source. Much of the prior work on the relation between affect and memory has been concerned Evidence consistent with this idea comes from a study by Hashtroudi, Johnson, Vnek, with whether emotion influences memory for content. For example, investigators have ex -and Ferguson (1994) . Hashtroudi et al. asked pairs of participants to act in a short, twoplored whether emotional information is more or less likely to be recalled or recognized than person play. Participants spoke lines as directed by the experimenter. Immediately after neutral information (e.g., Anooshian & Hertel, 1994) or whether it is more likely that one will the play, some were told to think about factual aspects of the play (what was said) and others remember an event if their mood at retrieval matches their mood at acquisition (e.g., were told to think about affective aspects of the play (what they were feeling during the Bower, 1992). Experimental work has largely taken the item or event as the unit of analysis, play), and still others were asked to think about the play without any special focus sugrather than attempting to assess the relative availability for complex events of various phe-gested. A source memory test followed in which statements from the play were mixed nomenal qualities that are evaluated by source monitoring mechanisms. This distinction is with new statements that were not in the play.
For each, participants indicated whether it was particularly important because recall or recognition that something happened before can be a line they said, one their acting partner said, or a new line that neither had said. Hashtroudi quite good while memory for its source is quite poor (e.g., Kahan & Johnson, 1990) . et al. found that older adults (mean age Å 70 years) had a source monitoring deficit relative There is, however, some evidence suggesting that source confusions might vary with to younger adults (mean age Å 20 years) in the control and affective focus conditions, but level of affective involvement. After reviewing available studies on the relation be-not in the factual focus condition. These results suggested that thinking about one's emotween emotion and memory, Christianson (1992) concluded that affect tends to reduce tions leads to poorer source monitoring, at least for older adults. memory for peripheral but not central aspects of an event (but see Heuer & Reisberg, 1992) .
Affective focus may hurt later source monitoring if, when people focus internally on Insofar as peripheral details are sometimes critical for identifying the source of informa-themselves and what they are feeling, they do not process external, perceptual information tion, this suggests that emotion might increase source confusions. Suengas and Johnson as well. In order to later distinguish who said what, the fact or content of what was said has (1988) asked participants to engage in or imagine engaging in a number of activities to have been associated or ''bound'' with the perceptual features of the person speaking, for such as writing a letter, meeting someone, and having coffee and cookies. Subsequently, par-example, features such as the speaker's voice and expression. The results of the Hashtroudi how speakers seemed to feel about what they were saying, there should be a greater chance et al. (1994) study suggest that older adults experience a trade-off. That is, if they focus that listeners will bind features of the speaker to the semantic content of what is being said. on their own internal feelings it costs them in retrieving factual information as they think Thus in Experiment 1 we contrasted a condition in which participants focused on how they about events. In contrast, younger adults did not seem to experience such a trade-off.
themselves felt with a condition in which participants focused on how the speakers felt. If However, it clearly would be incorrect to draw a general conclusion that the source simply attending to emotional aspects of events is the critical factor, the two groups monitoring of young adults is not affected by the type of focus in which they engage. should perform similarly on a subsequent source memory test. If, on the other hand, the Younger adults very likely would experience a trade-off between perceptual and affective problem is created when the emotional focus is self-directed and hence reduces processing processing under appropriate circumstances. For example, Hashtroudi et al. (1994) varied that binds speakers' features to content, source monitoring should be better when the emoparticipants' focus after the initial encoding of the events to be tested, as participants thought tional focus is directed at the speaker than when it is directed at the self. about the play in retrospect. Perhaps younger adults already had well-encoded information Our primary interest was in determining whether the direction of affective focus (self that would help them later specify source and so the retrospective manipulation of focus was or other) would affect source monitoring accuracy. However, we also had speakers make not particularly powerful. Young adults may be more likely to show the impact of different statements that varied in rated emotional intensity. Our expectation was that the source focus conditions when the critical information is initially encountered.
accuracy for more intensely emotional statements might suffer most from Self-focus beIn summary, prior work suggests that young adults might show relatively low levels of cause high intensity statements might be most likely to maintain participants' Self-focus. source monitoring if they are induced to focus during initial encoding on how they feel. Af-EXPERIMENT 1 fective Self-focus should have a negative impact on source monitoring because it reduces
In Experiment 1, participants heard an auditory tape of two individuals, a man and a the chances that a listener will bind features of the speaker (e.g., voice quality, inferred woman, making statements about a wide range of topics varying in the strength of the afattitudes, etc.) to the semantic content of what is being said. Connecting or binding such fea-fective response they are likely to evoke, for example, I like unusual food, Most holidays tures together is critical for accurate complex, episodic memories. However, we also rea-have become too commercialized, Affirmative action is an unfair policy. In the Other-focus soned that affective focus may not inevitably produce poor source monitoring. Rather, af-condition, participants were asked to rate how they thought the speaker felt about what he fective focus should hurt source monitoring only when affective information is processed or she was saying. In the Self-focus condition, participants were asked to rate how they felt at the expense of other types of information that are potentially more useful later for iden-about what the speaker was saying. Thus, both of the tasks involved thinking about emotion, tifying the origin of remembered information. If an affective focus did not detract from but but they differed in whether the listener was focusing externally, on the speakers, or interrather promoted the binding of speaker features to the content of what is being said, then nally, on what they themselves were feeling.
Participants then received a booklet in which source monitoring should later be relatively accurate. For example, if listeners focused on the presented statements were intermixed ran-evoked by the sentence. For example, the sentence domly with new statements and they were (e.g., actor read speaker A statements, and the fepreferences for different foods or drinks, permale actor read speaker B statements). A secformance of different politicians, or approond tape was made in which the sets of sentenpriate punishments for various crimes). The ces assigned to the two speakers were statements were selected to vary in the degree switched. The order of the statements on the to which they would evoke emotional retapes was random with the restriction that one sponses. This was confirmed by having 44 speaker did not say more than two statements undergraduates (24 men and 20 women) who before the other speaker said a statement. The did not otherwise participate in these studies same order was used for both tapes. The staterate the 90 statements according to the followments were read at approximately a 6-s rate. ing instructions:
Included at the beginning of each tape was a dialog between the two speakers (portrayed We would like you to read the following sentences as participants in an earlier experiment) and and judge their emotional impact. In evaluating each sentence try to gauge the level of emotion which is a third actor (portrayed as an experimenter).
The experimenter on the tape told the two as quickly and accurately as possible to each statement, the experimenter played the next speakers that they would be asked to write responses to a series of questions. After the section of the tape in which the speakers read the 60 sentences. The acquisition phase, inexperimenter instructs them to begin, the tape shifted to the end of the task. At this point, the cluding the instructions and the dialog, took approximately 15 min. experimenter on the tape asked the speakers to read the statements that they had generated, At the end of the tape, the participants were instructed to turn to the next section of the and the two speakers began to read their (alleged) responses. Thus, from the (real) partici-booklet consisting of a subset of the WAIS-R vocabulary test and three simple problems pants' point of view, the speakers were reading statements that expressed their knowledge, (e.g., the nine-dot problem). This section was included as a filler task between the acquisiopinions, or autobiographical events.
Procedure. Three group testing sessions tion and test phases of the experiment (i.e., it was unrelated to the experimental tasks). The were conducted with the two audio tapes alternately used for each section (a total of 23 participants were instructed to first complete the vocabulary test, and to then work on the and 22 participants received the first order and second orders, respectively). At the beginning three problems in the remaining period of time. The participants were given 10 min. to of the experiment, participants were given a booklet containing response sheets and in-complete this section of the experiment.
For the test phase, the booklet included a structions for the entire experiment. For the acquisition phase, the experimenter informed section in which the 90 statements (60 old and 30 new) were printed in an intermixed order, the participants that they would be listening to a tape made from an earlier study. The first with the restriction that no more than three statements from any one source (i.e., A, B, portion of the tape, containing the dialog between the speakers and the experimenter, was or New) be presented in a row. In addition, statements presented successively during acthen played. At the end of the dialog, the tape was paused, and participants were asked to quisition were not presented successively during test, and the first and last statements preread the instructions on the first page of their booklet. For both conditions, participants were sented during acquisition were not the first and last statements during test. Participants asked to indicate their response to each statement by circling a number on a scale from 1 were asked to decide whether each statement was made by speaker A, speaker B, or was to 5. In the Self-focus condition (N Å 22), participants were told that we were interested New. Responses were made by circling the appropriate letter (i.e., A, B, or N) at the right in the extent to which people agreed in their feelings about various topics. They were in-of each sentence. Participants were also asked to rate their confidence for each response on structed to rate how they felt about what the person is saying and to indicate how much a scale from 1 (guessing) to 3 (highly confident). The test phase was self-paced and on they agreed with each statement on a scale from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree average took approximately 15 min. to complete. strongly). In the Other-focus condition (N Å 23), participants were told that we were interResults and Discussion ested in people's ability to perceive other people's emotions. They were instructed to rate Corrected recognition scores were computed by obtaining, for each participant, the how much they thought the speakers agreed with what they were saying on a scale from proportion of test items that were correct old responses to old items (hits), regardless of 1 (does not feel very strongly) to 5 (does feel very strongly). A separate scale was provided source accuracy, minus the proportion of incorrect old responses to new items (false posifor each statement in the response sheets. After instructing the participants to respond tives). Source monitoring scores were com- puted by obtaining, for each participant, the pants' mean confidence was significantly correlated with their source accuracy scores both proportion of statements correctly recognized as old that were also attributed to the correct within the Other-focus (r Å .56, p õ .01) and the Self-focus (r Å .68, p õ .01) conditions. source (e.g., Foley, Johnson, & Raye, 1983) . These scores are shown in Table 1, along with We also calculated a source monitoring score for each statement by taking the proporthe mean confidence rating given to items identified as old that were correctly and incor-tion of individuals identifying it as old who had also correctly identified its source. These rectly attributed to source. Recognition was greater in the Self-focus (.92) condition than scores were then correlated with the mean emotion ratings for each statement collected in the Other-focus (.81) condition, F(1,43) Å 6.55, MSE Å .02. In contrast, and as predicted, from other participants in the norming study (see Method, above). There was a significant source accuracy was lower in the Self-focus (.64) condition than in the Other-focus (.82) negative correlation between rated emotion and source monitoring accuracy in the Selfcondition, F(1,43) Å 16.24, MSE Å .02.
A 2 (Response: Correct vs Incorrect) 1 2 focus condition (r Å 0.34, p õ .01) but not for these same sentences in the Other-focus (Condition: Self-focus vs Other-focus) analysis of variance on the confidence ratings pro-condition (r Å 0.09, p ú .10). This finding indicates that when participants focused on duced main effects for response, F(1,39) Å 47.78, MSE Å .04, and condition, F(1,39) Å their own feelings, they were later most likely to make source monitoring errors for those 4.73, MSE Å .36, and an interaction of response 1 condition, F(1,39) Å 8.35, MSE Å items with higher emotional content.
2
The results of Experiment 1 were straight-.04.
1 Participants expressed higher confidence when they attributed a statement to the correct forward and as predicted: Subjects were better able to discriminate statements that had been than to the incorrect source, and they expressed higher confidence in the Other-focus said from those that had not been said when they had focused on their own emotions than than the Self-focus conditions, especially for correct responses. We also found that partici-when they had focused on the speakers' emotions. In contrast, overall source accuracy was much better when listeners had focused on 1 There are minor variations in degrees of freedom for how the speakers might feel than when they the analyses within each experiment for the following reasons. Four of the 45 participants in Experiment 1 and had focused on how they, themselves, felt 2 of the 87 participants in Experiment 3 did not complete about what was being said. Furthermore, in the confidence ratings for each item, so were not included the Self-focus condition, participants were in the ANOVAs comparing confidence for correct and least likely to correctly identify the origin of incorrect source attributions. In Experiment 3, two participants showed no variability in responding to one of the 2 For New items, there was no significant correlation MCQ items (e.g., one gave a response of 1 on visual detail for all statements), and their data did not contribute between emotion ratings and number of false alarms in any of the three experiments. to the correlations computed for the particular items.
those statements with the highest emotional by handing out the booklets in random order.
The cover story, materials, and counterbalanccontent. These results clearly demonstrate that focusing on one's own feelings may help ing of sentences across speakers were as in Experiment 1, with the exception that two femake a statement memorable, but it will not necessarily allow one to identify later the ori-male speakers were videotaped as they read the statements of speakers A and B. The gin of the information. Presumably, focusing on one's own emotions reduces the processing speakers, although relatively similar in appearance (both in their mid-20s, white, casudirected at perceptual and other features of the event that are needed to identify its source.
ally dressed), were clearly distinguishable. As with Experiment 1, a second videotape was EXPERIMENT 2 made in which the statements read by the speakers were switched and the two tapes It could be that focusing on one's own emotions results in poor source monitoring only were randomly assigned to groups (37 and 50 participants saw Tapes 1 and 2, respectively). under relatively impoverished conditions (i. e., cues restricted to one modality). For The dialog between the speakers and the experimenter that set up the ''cover'' story was example, if speakers could be seen as well as heard, the resulting memory for visual cues also videotaped.
The procedure for testing participants was might result in better source information; or, perhaps the source monitoring errors that are as followed in Experiment 1. Participants performed the acquisition task according to their observed result from participants adopting a relatively lax criterion for source monitoring. condition. Following the filler task (i.e., the subset of the WAIS-R and the three probPrevious research indicates that tests vary in the extent to which they encourage partici-lems), participants performed the sourcememory test (i.e., identified whether statepants to closely examine the qualities of their memories and that closer examination is asso-ments were made by speaker A, B, or were new statements). As in Experiment 1, particiciated with fewer source monitoring errors (Dodson & Johnson, 1993 ; Lindsay & John-pants rated their confidence in each response on a scale from 1 (guessing) to 3 (highly conson, 1989). The purpose of Experiment 2 was to determine if the basic findings of Experi-fident). ment 1 would generalize to a situation in Results and Discussion which speakers had been seen as well as heard during acquisition. In addition, Experiment 2
The data were scored as in Experiment 1 and mean recognition and source identificaserved as a preliminary study for Experiment 3. In Experiment 3 we asked participants to tion scores are shown in Table 2 , along with confidence ratings for items correctly identirate their memories for several qualitative characteristics (e.g., visual detail) during the fied as old that were correctly and incorrectly attributed to source. As in Experiment 1, recsource test in order to induce relatively stringent criteria for source judgments and to as-ognition was higher in the Self-focus than in the Other-focus condition, F(1,85) Å 37.83, sess their phenomenal experience while remembering.
MSE Å .01. Again, source accuracy was lower for Self-focus than for Other-focus, F(1,85) Å Method 85.01, MSE Å .01. Also replicating Experiment 1, participants were more confident Eighty-seven Princeton undergraduates (45 men and 42 women) participated as part of an about correct than incorrect source attributions, F(1,83) Å 96.54, MSE Å .02, and more introductory psychology classroom demonstration in five group testing sessions. As in confident in the Other-focus than in the Selffocus condition, F(1,83) Å 42.69), MSE Å .39. Experiment 1, they were randomly assigned to the Self-focus (N Å 43) or Other-focus (N Also, the difference in confidence between the Other-focus and Self-focus conditions was Å 44) conditions within each testing session The results also sugThe correlation between confidence and gest that emotional Self-focus makes it more source accuracy was .47 (p õ .002) in the likely that source accuracy will be negatively Other-focus condition and .54 (p õ .001) in correlated with the intensity of the emotional the Self-focus condition. The correlation be-content of statements. Thus, the results of Extween the rated emotional content of sentences periments 1 and 2 clearly demonstrate that and the source monitoring accuracy on the focusing on one's own emotions may disrupt sentence across subjects was 0.08 (p õ .53) source monitoring relative to focusing on the in the Other-focus condition and 0.23 (p õ speakers' emotions. .07) in the Self-focus condition.
In Experiment 3, we investigated whether The overall level of source monitoring in Ex-focusing on one's own emotions is always detperiment 2 was lower than that in Experiment rimental for source monitoring. We suspected 1, indicating that discriminating from memory that the effect of emotional Self-focus would between two female speakers on the video was depend on what the emotion is about (i.e., the more difficult than between the male and female target). That is, self-focused emotion is not speakers on the audio tape used in Experiment simply a generalized orientation to the self, 1 under comparable orienting tasks (see also but rather potentially has reference to objects, Johnson, De Leonardis, Hashtroudi, & Fergu-events, individuals, ideas, and feelings from son, 1995). Nevertheless, again, recognition both the external and the internal worlds of benefited from Self-focus while source accuracy the individual. Focusing on how one feels was poorer in the Self-focus than the Other-about the ideas someone expresses, for examfocus condition. Whereas the correlation be-ple, may lead to quite different perceptual and tween source accuracy and rated emotional con-reflective activity than focusing on how one tent of the statements in the Other-focus condi-feels about the person who expresses those tion was about the same in Experiments 1 and ideas. Thus, Experiment 3 varied the target of 2 (0.09 and 0.08, respectively), in the Self-self-focused emotion. focus condition the correlation was somewhat All participants watched the same video lower in Experiment 2 (0.23, p õ .07) than in used in Experiment 2. Some participants were Experiment 1 (0.34, p õ .01). Nevertheless, the told that they would later be asked to make general pattern was similar. It appears that in the some predictions about how these two people Self-focus, but not the Other-focus condition, would feel in various new situations (Otherparticipants tended to be less accurate in source focus); others were told that they would later attributions about sentences with higher emo-be asked how they felt about some of the same tional content.
topics and issues mentioned on the video EXPERIMENT 3 (Self-focus). These two conditions are, respectively, similar to the Other-focus and SelfExperiments 1 and 2 suggest that focusing on one's own emotions increases confusion focus conditions in Experiments 1 and 2 and were expected to yield a similar pattern of order to explore the relation between participants' subjective experience and their judgfindings. In a third condition (Self/speakerfocus), subjects were told they would later be ments about external sources of memories.
Finally, in Experiment 3 we manipulated asked how they felt about each of the two people on the video. Thus in this condition, the participants' focus by giving general orienting instructions before they viewed the participants were encouraged to think about how they, themselves, felt, but in relation to video, but we did not require an overt response to each statement during the acquisition phase the speakers rather than in relation to the content of what was said. If focusing on one's of the study. We were interested in seeing whether the general pattern from Experiments own feelings is most critical, this group should have low source monitoring scores like the 1 and 2 would hold under these more natural viewing conditions. Self-focus group. If, on the other hand, emotional Self-focus is less critical than whether Method the emotion is consistent with processing information that might later be useful for source
Participants. Fifty-three Princeton undergraduates (25 men and 28 women) particimonitoring (in this case characteristics of the speakers), then the Self/speaker-focus group pated in four group testing sessions as part of an introductory psychology classroom demonshould look more like the Other-focus group.
Another purpose of Experiment 3 was to stration. As in Experiments 1 and 2, they were randomly assigned to conditions within each collect participants' ratings of phenomenal qualities of their experiences while remember-testing session by handing out the booklets in random order. ing (e.g., Johnson et al., 1988; . Previously, we have collected Materials and procedure. The materials, counterbalancing of sentences across speakers such ratings in investigations of reality monitoring-where subjects are asked to differen-and procedures for testing were as in Experiment 2. Two female actors were videotaped tiate perceptually derived from reflectively generated events. Subjective ratings on a reading the statements of speakers A and B.
The same two videotapes were used in which Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ) assessing various qualitative characteristics the statements read by the actors were switched across tapes (28 and 25 participants (including visual, auditory, and affective detail) tend to be greater for memories of actual saw tapes 1 and 2, respectively).
For the acquisition phase, participants in than imagined events (see also Hashtroudi, Johnson, & Chrosniak, 1990 ; McGinnis & the three conditions were told that we were investigating the differences between inforRoberts, in press). Also, participants' confidence in the accuracy of their memories tends mation obtained from TV and information obtained from radio and that they were in the to be correlated with amount of perceptual detail and, for older adults, amount of emo-condition where they could both see and hear the speakers. Note that unlike Experiments 1 tional detail (Hashtroudi et al., 1990) ; and participants generally express higher confidence and 2, the participants were not required to make a responses to statements as they were for correct source attributions than for incorrect source attributions, although there are cer-read, but instead were directed to attend to the speakers and/or statements in order to answer tainly high confident errors and low confident correct responses (Johnson, Raye, Foley, & questions following the acquisition phase. Depending upon the condition to which they Foley, 1981) . These observations are generally consistent with the idea that people use were assigned, the participants were informed that following the video they would be asked qualitative characteristics of memories to make source attributions in reality monitoring a series of questions about either the speakers, their thoughts about the topics of the statesituations. In the present Experiment 3, we collected ratings of memory characteristics in ments, or their impressions of the speakers.
Participants in the Other-focus condition (N Å 17) were told that they would be asked to make predictions about each speaker based upon their overall impression formed from the video. They were instructed to think about how strongly each speaker felt about what she was saying as she read a statement. Participants in the Self-focus condition (N Å 18) were told that they would be asked about their feelings on some of the same topics and issues mentioned in the video. They were instructed to think about the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with each statement as it was read. Finally, participants in the Self/speakerfocus condition (N Å 18) were told that they would be asked to describe how they felt about each speaker in the video. They were instructed to think about how each statement contributed to their feelings about the speaker as she read the statement.
The materials for the test phase were similar to those used in Experiments 1 and 2. The 90 statements (60 old and 30 new) were printed in an intermixed order, with the same restrictions as described in Experiment 1. In addition to rating the confidence in their response to each statement, the participants were also given an abbreviated MCQ that asked them to rate the amount of visual detail, auditory detail, information about the speakers emotion, and information about their own emotion that was present for evaluation. All of these ratings (including confidence) were made on a scale from 1 (little or none) to 5 (a lot).
Results and Discussion
Corrected recognition and source monitoring scores were computed as in Experiments 1 and 2 and are shown in Table 3 . A onefactor, between-groups ANOVA of recognition scores indicated that the three conditions did not differ significantly from each other, F(2,50) õ 1.00. There were, however, differences among the conditions in source monitoring accuracy, F(2,50) Å 4.23, MSE Å .007. As shown in Table 3 , the Self-focus group was less accurate than either the Other-focus or Self/speaker-focus groups, which did not differ significantly from each other. [Recogni- tion and source monitoring for Experiments tional content of the sentences made by other 1, 2, and 3 were also analyzed using a participants and source monitoring accuracy multinomial-modeling approach. The major scores on the sentences for the participants in results, which agreed with those already re-Experiment 3. The correlation was not sigported, are shown in Appendix B.] nificant for any of the three conditions: Other- Table 3 also shows the mean MCQ ratings, focus (r Å .10, p õ .43), Self/speaker-focus separately for correct and incorrect source at-(r Å .05, p õ .71), and Self-focus (r Å 0.09, tributions for old items recognized as old, as-p õ .48). The negative correlation for Selfsessing overall confidence (C) in the memory, focus conditions between rated emotion and the amount of visual (V) and auditory (A) source accuracy found in Experiment 1 (r Å detail, and speaker's (SE) and participant's 0.34, p õ .01) and Experiment 2 (r Å 0.23, (PE) emotion. Several aspects of these ratings p õ .07) was not evident in Experiment 3. are worth noting. Confidence varied with con-One interesting possibility is that requiring dition, F(2,50) Å 3.97, MSE Å .60; the means participants to rate qualitative characteristics paralleled the accuracy scores in that partici-of their memories at the time of the test inpants were generally more confident about creased the chances that participants take a their responses in the Other-focus (4.22) and wider range of attributes into account in makSelf/speaker-focus (4.25) conditions than in ing source attributions (cf. Dodson & Johnson, the Self-focus condition (3.81). Overall, parti-1993). Another potentially relevant factor is cipants were more confident, F(1,50) Å that in Experiment 3, participants were not 158.30, MSE Å .14, and gave higher ratings required to respond to each statement during on qualitative characteristics, F(1,50) Å acquisition but rather were instructed to think 41.72, MSE Å .35, when they were correct about the material with respect to potential than when they were incorrect in their source questions they might be asked later. Thus, difjudgments (see also . A ferences in the relative emotional impact of Least Significant Difference (LSD) test indi-various statements on the type of processing cated that correct source judgments had higher engaged might have been less in Experiment ratings than incorrect source judgments for 3 than in Experiments 1 and 2 where particieach characteristic (V, A, SE, and PE) individ-pants were induced to process each statement ually. In addition, response (correct or incor-individually. rect) interacted with type of characteristic, Table 4 shows correlations obtained be-F(3,150) Å 5.33, MSE Å .06. From Table 3 , tween the mean rated qualitative characteristhis interaction reflects the fact that the differtics of memories (visual and auditory detail ence between ratings of the qualitative characand speaker's and participant's emotion) for teristics of correctly and incorrectly attributed each statement (averaged across participants memories was greater for visual detail (.52) and regardless of whether source was correct than for auditory detail (.37), speaker emotion or incorrect) and two other variables: the mean (.28), or participant's emotion (.32). Finally, confidence across participants assigned to refor correct source attributions, an LSD test sponses and the preexperimentally rated emoindicated that the Other-focus group gave tional content of the sentences. There are two higher ratings than the Self-focus group for aspects of these data worth noting. First, partivisual detail (p õ .02). In addition, Self/ cipants' confidence was significantly posispeaker-focus produced more richly detailed tively correlated with all memory characterismemories than Self-focus on all characteristics assessed (ps õ .05). Second, the statetics (ps õ .05) and more richly detailed memments that were higher in emotional content ories than Other-focus on auditory detail (p õ yielded memories that were rated higher in .08) and participant's emotion (p õ .05).
both speaker and participant emotion for all As for the previous experiments, we examined the relation between the ratings of emo-conditions, but memories that were rated For each participant, we also calculated the auditory detail or speaker's or participant's emotion (ps õ .01). The correlation between correlation between the MCQ rating given to a statement recognized as old and his or her source monitoring accuracy and auditory detail tended to be higher than speaker's (p õ source accuracy score (1, correct; 0, incorrect) for that statement. As shown in Table 5 , the .08) or participant's (p õ .11) emotion as well.
To summarize the results of Experiment 3, mean correlation between the MCQ ratings and source accuracy was significantly differ-whereas in Experiments 1 and 2, Self-focus resulted in higher recognition than did Otherent from zero for all memory characteristics assessed in every group. A 3 (focus condition) focus, in Experiment 3, recognition was not significantly affected by focus condition. Rec-1 4 (memory characteristic) ANOVA on these scores yielded a main effect of memory ognition may have been less sensitive to instructional manipulation in Experiment 3, in characteristic, F(3,144) Å 8.34, MSE Å .01. Subsequent LSD comparisons indicated that part, because participants were not required to respond to every item during acquisition. in Table 6 , which presents the distribution of responses at varying levels of confidence for More important, as in Experiments 1 and 2, participants in the Self-focus condition per-each of the three experiments. Given that confidence and each of the memory characterisformed more poorly than participants in the Other-focus condition on source identifica-tics were positively related (see Table 4 ), confidence provides a rough composite index of tion. Furthermore, source accuracy in the Self/ speaker-focus group looked more like the overall detail. The left side of Table 6 shows the percentage of correct source attributions Other-focus group than like the Self-focus group. Thus the results demonstrate that some assigned each confidence value and the right side shows the percentage of incorrect source types of emotional focus yield fewer subsequent source confusions than other types of attributions assigned each confidence value.
As noted previously, participants were generemotional focus. An emotional focus (either Other or Self) that promotes binding of poten-ally more confident about correct than incorrect responses in all three experiments. In adtially discriminating features of the speakers such as their expression, posture, and inferred dition, participants in the Self-focus condition were generally less confident than participants personality with the semantic content of what they are saying produces better source moni-in the Other-focus or the Self/speaker-focus conditions. Nevertheless, participants in all toring than an emotional focus on how the listener is reacting to what is being said.
conditions made some source misattributions with high confidence. As is clear, only in the The subjective MCQ ratings were consistent with this picture. The confidence ratings Self-focus condition of Experiment 2 were a majority (56%) of the incorrect source attribuyielded essentially the same picture as the accuracy scores, with participants more confi-tions given a rating of 1 (indicating guessing).
Generally, most incorrect source attributions dent in the Other-focus and Self/speaker-focus conditions than in the Self-focus condition. were made with medium to high confidence (a rating of 2 or 3 in Experiments 1 and 2 and Other-focus and Self/speaker-focus generally produced memories with more visual and au-a rating of 3, 4, or 5 in Experiment 3) and there were high confidence source confusions ditory detail and speaker emotion than did the Self-focus condition. These qualitative char-in all conditions. Presumably, the types of qualitative characteristics that yield high conacteristics, especially visual detail, were, presumably, the basis of participants' higher fidence for correct source attributions also yield high confidence for incorrect source atsource accuracy in the Other-focus and Self/ speaker-focus than in the Self-focus condi-tributions (e.g., Johnson & Raye, 1981). 3 Another interesting aspect of these data is tions. These qualitative characteristics would also, presumably, be the kinds of information that although participants in the Other-focus condition made fewer source errors than partiassessed if participants were asked to decide whether or not they ''recollected'' a statement or simply knew it was on the acquisition list cipants in the Self-focus condition, a higher GENERAL DISCUSSION proportion of the errors they did make were
The relation of emotion and memory is a made with high confidence. This pattern sugclassic problem and a number of general propgests the intriguing possibility that high conositions have been suggested. Among these fidence about particular elements of memories are the following: Memory should be better for events may reflect, in part, a generalized for emotionally charged information (e.g., confidence about the memory as a whole. For Brown & Kulick, 1977) ; memory should be example, in the present case, the participants worse for emotionally charged information (at in the Other-focus condition were in general least for high levels of arousal (Deffenbacher, justified in their high confidence in that their 1983)); emotion should improve memory for source accuracy for the statements made by central information at the expense of periphthe two speakers in the event depicted on the eral information (Easterbrook, 1959) . We tape was generally good. Thus, under some would like to offer another general proposiconditions, high confidence in inaccurate attrition: the relation between emotion and membutions about particular statements may reflect ory will depend on the specific nature of the a misplaced confidence arising from a generperceptual and reflective processing that the ally good memory for what the two speakers emotion promotes and the nature of the memsaid on the occasion as a whole. Alternatively, ory tasks individuals later face (e.g., Johnson, the Other-focus participants might have had Kolers & Roediger, 1984) . This relatively good representations of what the proposition, which we might call (after Morspeakers sounded or looked like as they spoke; ris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977 ; see also, Roeconjoined with the right content such percepdiger & Blaxton, 1987; Tulving & Thomson, tual detail would induce high confidence in 1973) ''transfer appropriate emotional proaccurate memories but conjoined with the cessing'' or TAEP, is illustrated by the present wrong content such detail would induce high studies. Focusing on one's own feelings about confidence in false memories. The present devarious statements (e.g., Affirmative action is sign does not allow us to sort out these possian unfair policy) made by two speakers either bilities so they remain interesting potential directions for future research.
increased or did not affect old/new recognition but consistently reduced source monitoring cus condition reported higher confidence (Experiments 1, 2, and 3) and more detail (Experiaccuracy relative to focusing on the speakers' feelings. Focusing on how one feels about the ment 3) than those in the Self-focus condition.
More generally, correct source attributions topics presumably induces a self-focused consideration of one's opinions, beliefs, typical had, on average, higher confidence and more rated detail. These data also demonstrate that behaviors, and autobiographical memories. Such activity would embed the statements in neither true nor false memories are recollected ''all or none''-misattributions, like correct a meaningful network of self-relevant information and should help recognition and recall attributions, varied in confidence, with some high confident errors. Presumably, high conof the information relative to, say, a task in which fewer meaningful relations are noted fidence responses, whether correct or incorrect, reflect the subjective experience of speor discovered (cf. Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Klein & Loftus, 1988) . On the other hand, cific detail associated with the semantic content of statements. focusing on how someone else feels about what they are saying presumably should inTaken together, these experiments begin to explore the potential consequences of emoduce perceptual examination of the person speaking for clues about how they feel, reflec-tional focus on memory for content and memory for source. It should be emphasized that tive reactivation of their demeanor during previous statements for comparison, and refer-we do not claim that affect is unique in its potential impact on source monitoring. That ence to evolving perceptual and personality schemas of the speaker. These types of activi-is, variations in the focus of processing that have nothing to do with emotion should have ties should increase the chances that what is being said will become bound to perceptual similar effects to what we have shown here, depending on whether the manipulation profeatures or a schematic representation of the speaker. Such bound item and feature infor-motes or detracts from establishing connections among features of complex memories mation is critical for source monitoring but less so for recognition and recall of the content that can later be used to identify the origin of the remembered information. On the other of what was said.
We also found, however, that source accu-hand, we do propose that variation in cognitive focus associated with emotion is a priracy was not reduced by Self-focus relative to Other-focus if participants focused on their mary mechanism by which emotion has its impact on source memory and memory in genfeelings about the speakers instead of their feelings about what the speakers said. Thus, eral. That is, emotion may have no direct influence on memory but rather have its impact a fairly subtle distinction between focusing on how one feels about the speaker and how one by influencing those perceptual and reflective processes which establish, revive and reconfeels about what is said can markedly affect the likelihood of making source confusions struct, and evaluate memories Johnson & Hirst, 1993; this situation. Again, we suggest that the difference reflects the specific nature of the 1994).
For example, when emotion induces perprocessing induced in the two cases. Focusing on how one feels about the speaker presum-ceptual or reflective processing directed at perceptual qualities, then tasks drawing on ably induces one to develop representations in which statements are bound to perceptual and perceptual representations should show benefits. When emotion does not inferred personality characteristics of the speakers rather than to one's own opinions, induce perceptual processing or detracts from it, then we should not expect benefits on tasks self-concept, and autobiographical memories.
The subjective MCQ ratings were generally where perceptual information is useful. Thus, just as source monitoring should vary with the consistent with the objective measures of source accuracy. Participants in the Other-fo-nature of the emotional processing, so might other tasks that depend on perceptual records source A when in fact it originated with source B. Because emotion fuels so much of our cog-(e.g., face recognition (Schooler & EngstlerSchooler, 1990) or identifying stimuli under nitive activity, we should not underestimate the extent to which it shapes our memories degraded conditions (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981) ). When emotion induces reflective processing for events and our opinions and beliefs, both for good and for ill (cf., Johnson & Sherman, that produces elaborative organization of events, then tasks, such as recall and recogni-1990). tion, that draw on these reflectively generated APPENDIX A representations should show benefits Johnson & Hirst, 1993 
Experiments 1, 2, and 3
Child molesters should be imprisoned permanently.
5.59
Because traditional measures of source and item memAverage rated emotional impact 3.62 ory have been noted to be confounded under certain cirNew Items cumstances (Murnane & Bayen, in press), a separate analNew York was the first capital of the ysis of the data using the multinomial-modeling approach United States.
1.64 (Batchelder & Riefer, 1990; Hu & Batchelder, 1994) was Elizabeth Taylor has been married many conducted for each of the three experiments. In general, times.
1.66 multinomial modeling provides separate and independent Monet was the Father of Impressionism.
1.77 measures of source memory (i.e., discriminating between The Renaissance began in Florence, Italy.
1.82 Speaker A or Speaker B statements) and item memory I grew up on the east coast.
2.18 (i.e., discriminating between old and new statements), Chocolate is my weakness.
2.25 as well as several other parameters reflecting different I have travelled to Europe several times.
2.27 response biases. I'd rather read a good mystery than a
The data from each experiment were first sorted into romance novel.
2.44 3 1 3 matrices containing the frequencies with which participants made each source-monitoring response (A, from the ANOVAs conducted on the corrected recognition and source identification measures discussed pre-B, or N) to each test-item source (Speaker A, Speaker B, or New). The frequency matrices for each experiment are viously. For Experiments 1 and 2, the value of parameter D (old/new discrimination) was higher for the Self-focus reported separately for each condition in Table 7 .
The frequency matrices were subsequently analyzed condition, and for Experiment 3 there appeared to be no difference for D across conditions. In contrast, for using the two-high threshold multinomial model introduced by Bayen, Murnane, and Erdfelder (1996) . The Experiments 1 and 2, the value of parameter d (source discrimination) was higher for the Other-focus than for analyses were conducted using a computer program for statistical inference for multinomial binary tree models the Self-focus. Similarly, for Experiment 3, the value of parameter d was higher for the Other-focus and Self/ (Hu, 1993). Because source and item memory were not expected to differ with source, we used Model 4 (see speaker-focus than for the Self-focus condition.
A separate set of analyses were conducted to confirm Bayen et al., in press, Fig. 4 ) for all three experiments. In brief, Model 4 assumes that item memory is equivalent whether or not the parameter differences identified above were significant. Within the multinomial modeling framefor all three sources (i.e., A, B, and N) and generates an overall estimate of item memory by setting the individual work, comparisons between matrices are accomplished by item recognition parameters for the three sources equal. Similarly, Model 4 assumes that source memory is equivalent for sources A and B and generates an overall esti- 
